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Introduction and summary
The authors are academic researchers in the field of technology and international
relations. We have a long-standing interest in UK global biological security
governance, biological security horizon scanning and foresight methods. We argue
that there are cross-cu ing lessons to be learnt from a wide range of stakeholders
involved in assessing and responding to opportunities and challenges raised by
technological innovation across a broad range of fields. To this end, we highlight the
need to consolidate domestic expertise in order to be part of the global process
through which global technology assessment norms are being shaped.
In this submission we:
1) Introduce the contested concept of global technology assessment, as an
increasingly important area of global policy relevant to UK interests.
We argue that it would serve the UK’s current and longer-term foreign policy
interests to more systematically monitor a) developments in science and
technology b) evolving norms and practices in emerging technology governance
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globally; and to c) formulate clearer guiding principles on the UK’s foreign
policy in this area.
2) Argue that there is a need for a new focal point for a UK global technology
assessment strategy.
We highlight the need for a co-ordinating institution – which could play a
pivotal role in linking up capacities domestically in the area of innovation
strategy and governance, with the UK’s foreign policy agenda. This body could i)
systematically track developments of relevance to UK foreign policy ii) support
the development and evolution of a more explicit and consolidated policy on
the issue of global technology assessment.
This would be a good time to discuss such a proposal, considering the UK’s
emerging foreign policy priorities, as well as the recent establishment of the
National Science and Technology Council and Office for Science and Technology
Strategy. It would help build upon existing and emerging domestic capacities-
and provide a new transmission-belt between domestic and international work in
this area.
3) Suggest an organizational blueprint for such a body, in order to stimulate
further discussion.
We show how such a body would potentially help build upon past and current
UK successes in international institution building- by increasing domestic
capacity to lead on international initiatives and foster closer collaboration with
industry other states in this area. Such a body would put the UK in a be er
position to understand and respond to ongoing global transformations which are
both mediated and driven by technological change.
4) Outline the type of issues such a body could address – highlighting how it
can help feed into both domestic and foreign policy.
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We further develop our case for such an institution through an examination of
just one topic area which such a body could address – specifically the impact of
developments in the biotechnology sector in the area of disarmament and
non-proliferation.
Context: technology assessment as an emerging area of UK
foreign policy
At both the national and the international level, there is a long history of a empts to
monitor, assess and manage the broader economic, social and political impacts of
technological change. The history of this area of policy can be traced back to the
establishment of predictive capacities, in numerous states from the 1960’s onwards-
as part of the emergence of state level planning more generally. Initially, technology
assessment focused primarily upon providing an early warning for government
planners of potential hazards associated with emerging technologies, based on
expert advice. Over time however, technology assessment has come to include a
much broader range of aims, institutions and activities.
Today technology assessment takes a broader view on the types of opportunities and
challenges technological change raises for society. The function of TA bodies has
also extended beyond a more traditional science advice model- coming to
incorporate approaches centred on:
i. the provision of expert advice;
ii. the facilitation of public discussion, and;
iii. the integration of social and economic considerations to the stewardship
and practice of innovation.
Since the 1960’s a range of national approaches to technology assessment have
emerged- which informs how states engage with technology assessment at the
domestic as well as the international level.
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In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in global technology assessment,
as well as emerging global technology assessment norms at the international level.
Something which is reflected in both states a empts to facilitate global discussion
and harmonization in relation to specific fields of technology, as well as a empt to
establish cross-national technology assessment norms more broadly. At the
international level, the value of global technology assessment approaches has been
of increasing interest to organisations such as the EU, OECD, as well as a number
of UN organizations, scientific organisations, international treaty regimes, as well
as broader international civil society.




The Global Technology Assessment is a network of non-profit
institutions from around the world working together in the area
of science and technology, promoting responsible and
sustainable research and innovation to tackle global grand
challenges.  Initiative membership includes a number of
government technology review, advisory and assessment




The currently 23 members of EPTA give advice to their
parliaments on topical issues such as nanotechnology, brain
research, mobility pricing or future energy systems.
Their projects use various methods and draw on insights from
citizen panels, stakeholders, workshops as well as the foremost




Contemporary developments in science and technology present
new opportunities as well as challenges to international
security and disarmament.
UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme (SecTec)
seeks to build knowledge and awareness on the international
security implications and risks of specific technological
innovations and convenes stakeholders to explore ideas and
develop new thinking on ways to address them.
The International
Academies Partnership
The InterAcademy Partnership (IAP) empowers academies and
regional academy networks to provide independent,
authoritative advice on global, regional, and national issues
through synthesis reports, consensus statements, foresight









The goal of the Technology Facilitation Mechanism is to
support the implementation of the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs).
Its goal is to facilitate multi-stakeholder collaboration and
partnerships through the sharing of information, experiences,
best practices and policy advice among Member States, civil
society, the private sector, the scientific community, United
Nations entities and other stakeholders. 
States with the largest economies globally, have either a long term, or emerging
interest in technology assessment – and such policy is becoming increasingly
outward looking. In recent G20 meetings for example, the issue of global
co-operation in innovation and innovation strategy have been an increasingly
prominent feature.
Broadening and deepening collaboration in this space, however, will not be without
technical and political challenges. A recent cross-national review of technology
assessment approaches points to a number of ways in which states can be
distinguished in ideological terms on the issue of technology assessment.
To this end, the review points to a number of key considerations which will be
important to efforts to foster global collaboration in this area. These include:
i. the diverse political systems of prominent states (e.g., authoritarian, liberal);
ii. state preferences on the character of global institutions (e.g., multi-level,
top-down);
iii. the socio-economic profile of states (e.g., established economic power, rising
economic power);
iv. broader societal values and norms (e.g., individualism, collectivism), and;
v. broader societal engagement with policy making (e.g., expert led, inclusive)1
1 Hahn, Julia & Ladikas, M. & Kulakov, P. & Kazakova, A.A.. (2019). Constructing a global
Technology Assessment: ways forward, parameters and limitations. Philosophy of Science and
Technology. 24. 96-108. 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-2-96-108.
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In this context then, the UK will need to work pro-actively to shape norms in this
area.
The UK has traditionally played a prominent role in supporting global innovation
and global institution building – and the UK’s commitments to these areas of
foreign policy have been reasserted as part of the recent Integrated Review2.
As part of this work the government laid out a ‘Strategic Framework to 2025’ which
gave a prominent role to both global institutions building and fostering scientific
and technological innovation:
…we will take a more active approach to building and sustaining strategic
advantage through S&T in support of our national goals. We will create the
enabling environment for a thriving S&T ecosystem in the UK and extend
our international collaboration, ensuring that the UK’s successful research
base translates into influence over the critical and emerging technologies
that are central to geopolitical competition and our future prosperity.
We will adopt an own-collaborate-access framework to guide government
activity in priority areas of S&T, such as AI, quantum technologies and
engineering biology.
It is clear then, that that the UK will need to continue to develop its domestic
capacity to monitor and assess technological change, as well as to understand and
shape emerging technology governance at the global level.
To this end, we recommend that the UK should consolidate and integrate
domestic expert capacity in order to:





ii. understand the emerging global technology assessment government
ecosystem, and;
iii. support the development of principles and priorities in UK foreign policy
in this area.
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Establishing a UK technology assessment coordinating body
The UK, as a first step, should seek to establish a co-ordinating body, initially tasked
with:
1) reviewing trends in science and technology and broader innovation
governance practices globally of relevance to UK foreign policy priority
areas, and;
2) formulating options for a UK Global Technology Assessment Strategy.
The body should have a broad inclusive participation from across government,
political parties, and wider civil society. It would work closely with but have a
distinct brief to existing assessment and advisory bodies within government,
including, but not limited to; the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, as
well as existing horizon scanning and foresight capacities within the Government
Office for Science and Defence Science and Technology Laboratory.
The organizational structure, and institutional affiliation of the co-ordinating body
could take many forms, but in-order for our proposal to stimulate discussion, we
suggest it could be initially administered directly by the FCO and could have a
four-part structure:
Steering Commi ee: An FCO led leadership panel tasked with establishing standing
and open-ended ad hoc working groups on key priority areas of technology and/or
foreign policy objectives.
Administration and Reporting Body: Tasked with producing and disseminating
report materials produced in collaboration with working groups, as well as the
day-to-day administration of the functioning of the body.
UK Global Technology Assessment Strategy Working Group: This group will
include senior representation for key stakeholders- as well as expert groups
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members. Initially it should be tasked with the development of policy options. Later
tasks might include strategy implementation monitoring and review.
Emerging Technology and Foreign Policy Working Groups: These working groups
are designed and populated by the steering commi ee. It is likely that there would
need to be standing commi ees, arranged around important foreign policy agenda
areas- or else specific areas emerging technology. The working groups would consist
of relevant technical experts and stakeholder representatives- nominated by the
steering comi ee.
These groups would develop periodic reports, which would be collated and
published by the reporting body. Such groups could report on:
i. relevant R&D, technological and emerging market trends;
ii. potential impacts of emerging technologies on UK foreign policy, and;
iii. initiatives, good practice, and challenges of relevance to the global
governance of emerging technologies.
Several organizational and political questions are raised by such a proposal. This
includes, for example, questions of resources, representation, the specifics of the
working-group briefs, and the assumed long-term necessity of an organization such
as this.
Demonstrating the potential scope and added value of an
emerging technology and foreign policy co-ordinating body.
In the remainder of this submission, we highlight on the type of information that an
Emerging Technology and Foreign Policy Working Group could collate - as well as
the type of questions and recommendations the working groups might point to for
consideration as part of broader UK technology assessment strategy. We do this
with reference to just one narrow area of concern- specifically the impact of
emerging technology on the risk of biological weapon proliferation.
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Background
The UK has played a leading role historically in the prohibition and
non-proliferation regime directed at biological weapons. This includes a prominent
role in the negotiation and continued evolution of the Biological and Toxin Weapon
Convention treaty regime - reflected most recently for example in UK participation
in preparations for the Ninth Review Conference. This is in addition to the areas of
export control harmonisation, global public health, global laboratory safety and
security as well as the UK’s long-term support for disarmament education for
practicing life-sciences.
In this area, the UK has an opportunity to both build upon this legacy of
international leadership and to capitalise on the unique circumstances presented
by the convergence of a post-Brexit and post-COVID19 world in the coming years. 
Developments in science and technology
(Biological) technology capabilities are expanding rapidly and international regimes
governing biological research date back several decades. The convergent and
frenetic nature of biotechnology advances raise significant proliferation concerns -
and present incremental as well as more fundamental challenges to the existing
global biological weapon control regime.3
Currently, discussion and assessment of biological weapon proliferation risks take
place in a wide range of contexts.4 There is then always a substantial stream of both
primary data on scientific trends, as well as expert discussion of the potential
proliferation potentials of technology to keep track on in the open literature.
4 J. Revill, A. Anand and G. Persi Paoli. ( 2021) Exploring Science and Technology Review Mechanisms
Under the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, Swi erland: UNIDIR,
h ps://doi.org/10.37559/SECTEC/2021/SandTreviews/01
3 Wintle, Bonnie C et al., 2017. A transatlantic perspective on 20 emerging issues in biological
engineering. eLife, 6, eLife, 2017–11-14, Vol.6. h ps://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29132504/ Luke et al.,
2020. Bioengineering horizon scan 2020. eLife, 9, pp.eLife, 2020–05-29, Vol.9.
h ps://elifesciences.org/articles/54489
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The timely analysis of such work can provide an evidence base about the impacts
of such advances in the area of non-proliferation and help support the UK in
anticipating and shaping discussions of such developments at the global level.
Evolving norms and practices in emerging technology governance globally
International regimes that work to prevent the development and proliferation of
biological weapons are multi-faceted and multi-layered. Scientific and technological
change has profound impacts upon these regimes.
This is reflected in the a empts by numerous states and civil-society groups to
engage technology assessment exercises in this area. It is also reflected in a empts to
strengthen the S&T review mechanism of the BTWC. In order to lead policy in this
area there is a need for the UK to support and track work that seeks to be er
understand the challenges involved in foresight of emerging biotechnologies5 6.
This then will allow the UK to develop and advocate good practice in the area. This
includes advancing the evidence and methods developed and utilized by UK science
advice and technology assessment institutions. It will also allow the UK to
show-case and adopt methods developed within academia, civil society, and the
private sector.
6 Currie, A. (2019). Existential risk, creativity & well-adapted science. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science Part A, 76, 39-48. h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/xrisk-creativity/
5 Beard, S., Rowe, T., & Fox, J. (2020). An analysis and evaluation of methods currently used to
quantify the likelihood of existential hazards. Futures, 115, 102469.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/analysis-evaluation-methods/
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Methods for emerging technology assessment, foresight, and accountability
Recent work by the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, has examined and
applied a range of methods as they relate to extreme risks7 and human survival8,
innovation assessment9 and governance10. 
1) In order to understand how biological research and innovation may interact
with or impact extreme risks or critical ecosystems, researchers have
applied a range of horizon scanning methods based on the investigate, discuss,
estimate, aggregate (IDEA) protocol.11 12 13
2) To help direct research activities towards the most pressing topics, they
have utilized a modified expert elicitation to identify specific questions that are
of sufficient breadth and importance gain an understanding of research
13 Jucker, T., Wintle, B., Shackelford, G., Bocquillon, P., Geffert, J. L., Kasoar, T., ... & Mukherjee, N.
(2018). Ten-year assessment of the 100 priority questions for global biodiversity conservation.
Conservation Biology, 32(6), 1457-1463.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/tenyear-assessment-questions-conservation/
12 Hemming, V., Burgman, M. A., Hanea, A. M., McBride, M. F., & Wintle, B. C. (2018). A practical
guide to structured expert elicitation using the IDEA protocol. Methods in Ecology and Evolution,
9(1), 169-180.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/practical-guide-structured-expert-elicitation-using-idea-protocol/
11 Hanea, A. M., McBride, M. F., Burgman, M. A., Wintle, B. C., Fidler, F., Flander, L., ... & Mascaro, S.
(2017). Investigate Discuss Estimate Aggregate for structured expert judgement. International Journal
of Forecasting, 33(1), 267-279.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/investigate-discuss-estimate-aggregate-structured-expert-judgemen
t/
10 Kemp, L., & Rhodes, C. (2020). The Cartography of Global Catastrophic Governance.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/cartography-global-catastrophic-governance/
9 Rhodes, C. (2020). Scientific freedom and responsibility in a biosecurity context. In The freedom of
scientific research. Manchester University Press.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/scientific-freedom-and-responsibility-biosecurity-context/
8 Beard, S., Rowe, T., & Fox, J. (2020). An analysis and evaluation of methods currently used to
quantify the likelihood of existential hazards. Futures, 115, 102469.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/analysis-evaluation-methods/





agendas within the life sciences globally, and that are of significance for the
UK.14
3) In the exploration of near-term developments in technology they have
advocated the use of regular expert elicitation exercises which emphasise a
diversity of experts, and which may incorporate a "red team" approach to
increase the range and creativity of scenarios considered.15 16 17
4) To assist in the exploration of longer-term (biological) technological
developments we recommend the use of theoretical analysis and survey work to
identify key themes and milestones that can structure future foresight
exercises. 18 19
Alongside a robust foresight capability, there is also a need to review developments,
good practice and expert recommendations related to governance of biotechnology
research, to mitigate potential concerns.
To this end, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk has also explored the prevalence,
utility and practical challenges associated with:
19 Cremer, C. Z., & Whi lestone, J. (2020). Canaries in Technology Mines: Warning Signs of
Transformative Progress in AI. h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/canaries-technology-mines/
18 Martınez-Plumed, F., Loe, B. S., Flach, P., O hEigeartaigh, S., Vold, K., & Hernández-Orallo, J.
(2018). The facets of artificial intelligence: a framework to track the evolution of AI. In International
Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 5180-5187).
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/facets-AI/
17 Kemp, L., Adam, L., Boehm, C. R., Breitling, R., Casagrande, R., Dando, M., ... & Sutherland, W. J.
(2020). Point of View: Bioengineering horizon scan 2020. Elife, 9, e54489.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/bioengineering-horizon-scan-2020/
16 Brundage, M., Avin, S., Clark, J., Toner, H., Eckersley, P., Garfinkel, B., ... & Amodei, D. (2018). The
malicious use of artificial intelligence: Forecasting, prevention, and mitigation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.07228. h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/malicious-use-artificial-intelligence/
15 Wintle, B. C., Boehm, C. R., Rhodes, C., Molloy, J. C., Mille , P., Adam, L., ... & Sutherland, W. J.




14Kemp, L., Aldridge, D. C., Booy, O., Bower, H., Browne, D., Burgmann, M., ... & Sutherland, W. J.
(2021). 80 questions for UK biological security. Plos one, 16(1), e0241190.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/80-questions-uk-biological-security/
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1) Integration of risk assessment into the earliest stages of developing and
procuring novel technologies, especially for safety-critical or defence-related
systems. 20
2) Ensuring throughout-lifetime accountability for high-technology systems,
particularly those used by the military. 21 22
3) Informing and instilling a culture of systemic risk awareness amongst
‘universal owners’, the class of institutional investors that by their nature
cannot stock-pick their way out of a crisis, thus aligning significant financial
interest and resources with broad risk management priorities. 23
4) Investing in regulation, auditing, and support for academic research to
build an ecosystem that is able to hold developers of emerging technologies
accountable, thus creating an environment where user trust can be placed in
trustworthy actors. 24
5) Experimental frameworks for collaborative governance of biological
research that address rapid changes in technical, social, and political
environments, coupled with the emergence of natural diseases such as
COVID-19, that are testing existing governance processes.25
25 Sam Weiss Evans, Jacob Beal, Kavita Berger, Diederik A. Bleijs, Alessia Cagne i, Francesca Ceroni,
Gerald L. Epstein, Natàlia Garcia-Reyero, David R. Gillum, Graeme Harkess, Nathan J. Hillson, Petra
24 Brundage, M., Avin, S., Wang, J., Belfield, H., Krueger, G., Hadfield, G., ... & Anderljung, M. (2020).
Toward trustworthy AI development: mechanisms for supporting verifiable claims. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2004.07213. h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/toward-trustworthy-ai/
23 Quigley, E. (2020). Universal Ownership in Practice: A Practical Positive Investment Framework for
Asset Owners. Available at SSRN 3638217.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/universal-ownership-practice/




21 Shackelford, G. E., Kemp, L., Rhodes, C., Sundaram, L., ÓhÉigeartaigh, S. S., Beard, S., ... &
Sutherland, W. J. (2020). Accumulating evidence using crowdsourcing and machine learning: A living
bibliography about existential risk and global catastrophic risk. Futures, 116, 102508.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/accumulating-evidence-using-crowdsourcing-and-machine-learnin
g-living-bibliography-about-existential-risk-and-global-catastrophic-risk/
20 Jayanti, A., & Avin, S. (2020). It Takes a Village: The Shared Responsibility of 'Raising' an
Autonomous Weapon. Submi ed to and Presented at RSIS Military Transformations Programme
Workshop. h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/it-takes-village/
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Formulating clearer guiding principles on the UK’s Foreign Policy in this area
In addition to tracking the above developments in technology and policy, there is
also a need to refine UK foreign policy in this area, as it relates to UK biosecurity
strategy.
In 2018, the UK government produced the ‘UK Biological Security Strategy’ which
was intended to bring together and set out in one place for the first time, the wide
range of activity that is carried out across Government to do this. The strategy
focused on the goals of Understanding, Preventing, Detecting and Responding to the
wide range of biological hazards the UK faces. The document also set out a series of
commitments related to its domestic and international facing policy.
Since this time, the emergence of COVID-19, and the broader impacts of the
pandemic on a wide range of policy areas, has had a profound effect on this area of
policy. In December 2020, Joint Commi ee on the National Security Strategy
Biosecurity and National Security Enquiry made a series of recommendations- to
which the UK government responded to these recommendations in March 2021.26 It
is clear that there will be significant developments in this area of UK policy in
coming years. Further to this, a recent academic study, has pointed to an even
broader range of issues facing policy makers in this area.27
The UK will continue to innovate both its domestic and international policy in
this area in response to longer-standing interests, as well as those raised by the
global pandemic. Such work will likely benefit for additional means of co-operation
and communication. In addition, the emphasis placed on both innovation and the
shaping of global norms seems to suggest that the UK will be expected to play an
27 Kemp, L., Aldridge, D. C., Booy, O., Bower, H., Browne, D., Burgmann, M., ... & Sutherland, W. J.
(2021). 80 questions for UK biological security. Plos one, 16(1), e0241190.
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/80-questions-uk-biological-security/
26 h ps://commi ees.parliament.uk/work/316/biosecurity-and-national-security/publications/
A. M. Hogervorst, Jacob L. Jordan, Geneviève Lacroix, Rebecca Mori , Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh, Megan J.
Palmer, Mark W. J. van Passel (2020) Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance
h ps://www.cser.ac.uk/resources/embrace-experimentation-biosecurity/
15
even more prominent role in the assessment of technological innovation as well as
the norms that shape it globally.
This points to the value of supporting the ongoing development and review of
policies specific to this issue area- but also to develop cross-cu ing insights, practices
and policies in the wide range of areas in which technology assessment and global
technology assessment norms are becoming increasingly pertinent.
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